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RECENT DECISIONS
BILLS AND NOTEs-HoLDER IN DuE COURSE-PURCHASE IN GOOD FAiTH.-Gra-
ham, the petitioner, held in his own right eight negotiable coupon bonds issued
by the State of Illinois. The bonds were stolen from Graham and were eventually
purchased by the respondent's Chicago office from a listed bond dealer in Min-
nesota. Three days after the theft Graham had taken steps to notify bond dealers
throughout the country. Notice was received by the respondent at its main office
and at its Chicago branch. At the time when the purchase was made the respond-
ent's clerks had forgotten about the information contained in the notice received.
The treasurer of Illinois began this proceeding according to the local practice to
have determined whether the holder, the respondent, or the claimant, the peti-
tioner, had the better right to the bonds. The trial judge ordered a decree for
the petitioner concluding that the purchaser could not qualify as a holder in due
course because it had received notice at its office about the stolen bonds. This
order was reversed and the case remanded by the appellate court. White- Philips
Co. v. Graham, 74 F. (2d) 417 (C.C.A. 7th, 1935). On certiorari in the Supreme
Court, held, judgment affirmed; the good faith of the purchaser must be de-
termined as of the date of the purchase. Grahant v. White-Philips Co., 56 Sup.
Ct. 21 (1935).
The issue in the instant case is narrow. Shall the position of the purchaser
be fixed by reason of his having received notice of the theft or shall his position
be fixed according to what he or his representatives knew or remembered at the
date of purchase? If his position is to be fixed by reason of the fact that he or
his clerks have received notice of the theft the inquiry is definitely objective. If
his position is to be fixed according to his or his clerk's state of mind at the
time of the purchase the question of "bad faith" becomes one for more or less
subjective estimate. The Supreme Court chose to consider the status of the pur-
chaser as being determined by his state of mind at the time of the purchase
which the Court felt has been the traditional test applied in cases of this kind. It
has been held that the receiving of notice by clerks at the office did not mean that
officers who completed the deal for the company-purchaser had knowledge of or
had seen the notice when so received, and that the company could qualify as a
bona fide purchaser. Merchants' Nat. Bank v. Detroit Trust Co., 258 Mich. 256,242
N.W. 739, 85 A.L.R. 350 (1932); Heney v. Sutro & Co., 28 Cal. App. 698, 153
Pac. 972 (1915). And if the person who has received notice himself forgets
when he makes the purchase he does not, according to some courts, necessarily
lose his status as a holder in due course. Lord v. Wilkinson, 56 Barb 593 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct., 1870) ; cf. Raphael v. Bank of England, 17 C. B. 161, 33 Eng. Rep. 276
(1855). The choosing intentionally to disregard all notices of theft may be
enough to affect the status of the professional purchaser-bank unless the latter
can explain the disregarding on the grounds of business convenience. Seybel v.
National Currency Bank, 54 N.Y. 288, 13 Am. Rep. 583 (1873). In the instant
case the petitioner contended that the rule had been fixed in Illinois that the
sending of notice to the purchaser's office was enough without more to fix the
status of the purchaser. The petitioner cited Northwestern Nat. Bak. v. Madison
& Kedsie St. Bak., 242 Ill. App. 22 (1926). The Supreme Court refused to ac-
cept the decision of an intermediate appellate court as fixing the rule for the
particular jurisdiction particularly when there is language in some of the state
supreme court's opinions which cannot be reconciled with the decision in the
cited case. See Paine v. Sheridan Trust & Savings Bank, 342 Ill. 342, 348, 174
N.E. 368, 369 (1930).
THE MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
It is the policy of courts generally to protect the free transfer of negotiable
paper. It is submitted, however, that the loser of the stolen bonds deserves some
consideration. If the disposition in a particular case depends upon the finding
with respect to the state of mind at the time of the purchase the judgment of
the fact finder is virtually unrestricted. In an equity case, and the instant case
was an equity case, the record will have to contain a finding with respect to the
purchaser's memory and recollections or the memory of the purchaser's
clerks at the -time of the purchase before a conclusion with respect to
good or bad faith can be supported. It is submitted that an additional objec-
tive standard the fact finders might be required to consider is whether the pur-
chaser, for example a bond house or a bank, has devised some scheme con-
sistent with business convenience to check stolen bond notices and to protect
themselves against making purchases of such bonds. See (1935) 45 YALE L. 3.
539. In such a case, too, the real determination would be with the fact finder,
but to consider what amounts to reasonable business practice would be an inquiry
in some degree less subjective than to inquire as to whether the officers of the
purchasing company have forgotten the notice of theft at the time of the pur-
chase. A bond house or a bank might well be held to abide by a higher standard
of conduct with respect to "checking notices" than an "unprofessional" pur-
chaser w6uld be required to follow.
CORPORATIONs-BY-LAws-RIGHT OF FIDUCIARY OFFICERS TO COMPENSATION.-
The defendant, a director, served also in the capacity of president and treasurer
of the corporation. Over a period of years, he appropriated to himself a con-
siderable amount of money as salaries and commissions. This action is by
minority stockholders for the appointment of a receiver and for judgment against
the defendant for the amount of corporate funds alleged to have been improp-
erly paid to him for his services. The contention is based on a by-law which
forbade any compensation for services of any nature to be allowed to any officer
or director of the corporation unless consent to the same had first been given
by the owners of three-fourths of the trust certificates. The defense was that the
by-law was void since it violated Section 180.13 of the Wisconsin Statutes (1933)
which provides that: "the stock, property, affairs, and business of every such
stock corporation, shall be under the care of and be managed by a board of
directors." The trial court found for the plaintiff. On appeal, held, judgment as
to this defendant reversed and the cause remanded. Security Savings and Trust
Co. v. Coos Bay Lumber and Coal Co. (Wis. 1935) 263 N.W. 187.
The by-laws of a corporation which are contrary to or inconsistent with a
governing statute, are void, even though they may have been unanimously
assented to by the stockholders. They must be consistent both with the terms
and with the spirit and intent of the governing statute. 14 C. J. 362. In the case
of State ex rel. Badger Telephone Co. v. Rosenow, 174 Wis. 9, 182 N.W. 324
(1921) the by-laws provided that the corporation's secretary-treasurer was to be
elected by the stockholders. The court pointed out that such a by-law was
repugnant to a statute which provided that it is within the province of the
directors to elect that officer. See Wis. STAT. (1933) § 180.13. The same rule
applies to situations where the charter vests the management of the corporate
affairs in a board of directors and where later a by-law is enacted vesting the
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